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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-SEEKING REDRESS AGAINST 
THE SOVEREIGN: BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFFS AND THE 
GOVERNMENT WHEN ApPLYING FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCE­
DURE 15(c) TO FTCA CLAIMS 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2000, the Boston Globe published a series of arti­
cles exposing corruption within the Boston office of the Federal Bu­
reau of Investigation (FBI).1 One such piece focused on the 1965 
slaying of Edward "Teddy" Deegan by two FBI informants.2 The 
article discussed "secret documents" that demonstrated the FBI 
knew beforehand of the informants' plans, but did nothing to stop 
the murder.3 Upon learning of the FBI's appalling actions, Teddy 
Deegan's brother, Richard, filed an administrative wrongful death 
claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
1. Ralph Ranalli, FBI Reportedly Hid Key Evidence, Documents Show It Knew of 
Deegan Slaying Plot in '65, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2000, at B1 [hereinafter FBI Re­
portedly Hid Key Evidence], available at 2000 WLNR 2285990 (Westlaw); see also Pat­
terson v. United States, 451 F.3d 268, 269 (1st Cir. 2006) (decision involving wrongful 
death claims arising from this alleged corruption). For more articles published in the 
Boston Globe alleging similar FBI corruption in Massachusetts, see Ralph Ranalli & 
Shelley Murphy, New Rules on u.s. Informants Call for Scrutiny, Safeguards Changes 
Reflect the Fallout from Bulger-FBI Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12,2001, at B6, availa­
ble at 2001 WLNR 2244995 (Westlaw); Ralph Ranalli, Papers May Tell of Slay Framing 
Judge to Read 1968 Transcript, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13,2000, at B3, available at 2000 
WLNR 2305468 (Westlaw). 
2. FBI Reportedly Hid Key Evidence, supra note 1, at B1. 
3. Deegan was described as a "small-time hoodlum" who was targeted for murder 
by mafia members who were also FBI informants. Id. One key report stated that a full 
two days before Deegan's murder, another FBI informant told an FBI Special Agent 
that hit men were planning to kill Deegan, and that the murder had the blessing of the 
then New England Mafia boss, Raymond L.S. Patriarca. Id. Even so, the FBI did noth­
ing to warn or otherwise protect Deegan, and he was shot to death in a Chelsea, Massa­
chusetts, alley. Id. For an in-depth recounting of the Deegan tragedy, see Hans 
Sherrer, FBI's Legacy ofShame, Timeline of the FBI's Four-Decades Long Cover-Up of 
Complicity in Edward Deegan's Murder, and the Agencies Frame-Up of Four Innocent 
Men, JUSTICE: DENIED MAG., Winter 2005, at 24, available at http://justicedenied.orgl 
issue/issue_27 /fbi 's_legacy _ oCshame.h tm!. 
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(FICA).4 However, the claim was subsequently denied on techni­
cal grounds.5 
Nearly a year later, Teddy Deegan's daughter, Catherine 
Deegan Patterson, and her sister, Yvonne Deegan Gioka, submit­
ted their own administrative FICA claim against the government6 
for wrongful death and infliction of emotional distress.7 However, 
their administrative claim was filed after the FICA's two-year stat­
ute of limitations had tolled; therefore, it was denied by the govern­
ment on the ground that it was time-barred.8 In response, 
Catherine and Yvonne filed a claim in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, arguing that even if untimely, their 
complaint should nonetheless "relate back" to the date of Richard 
Deegan's original administrative FICA claim and avoid being swal­
lowed up by the government's statute of limitations defense.9 
The relation-back doctrine, codified by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) 15(c), has been applied in the context of FICA 
claims with conflicting results, leading to uncertainty as to whether 
the rule is applicable in such disputes.1o Presently, a split in the 
federal courts of appeals exists over the application of FRCP 15(c) 
to claims filed pursuant to the FICA; with a number of circuits 
(and recently lower courts) holding that relation back is not allowed 
to save any untimely FTCA claims, regardless of the 
circumstance.11 
4. Patterson, 451 F.3d at 269. 
5. Id. Richard Deegan was purporting to act as the "voluntary" administrator of 
Teddy's estate when he filed the administrative claim. Id. The claim was denied on the 
ground that Massachusetts law does not recognize the authority of voluntary adminis­
trators to pursue wrongful death claims. /d. 
6. All FICA claims must first be presented to the federal agency whose employee 
allegedly committed the tortious conduct before suit may be filed in court. See infra 
text accompanying notes 163-165. 
7. Patterson, 451 F.3d at 269. "Patterson was acting as the newly-appointed ad­
ministrator of her father's estate," distinguishing her claim from Richard Deegan's. Id. 
8. Id. at 269-70. 
9. Id. at 270. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and sub­
sequently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, also denied Catherine Deegan 
Patterson's claim. Id. The First Circuit held that relation back, "even if permissible," 
was not appropriate in this situation, because Richard Deegan's original claim was itself 
untimely, "and thus [Patterson's] attempts to have [her] claims relate back to that claim 
are plainly futile." Id. at 273. However, the First Circuit left to another day the issue of 
whether relation back is at all permissible in FICA claims. Id. 
10. Compare Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987), and Withrow 
v. United States, No. Civ. A. 5:05-152-JMH, 2005 WL 2403730 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 
2005), with Avila v. INS, 731 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1984). 
11. See infra Part II. 
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This Note focuses on the factors that a court should be aware 
of when claimants like Catherine and Yvonne argue that their 
amended FfCA claims relate back to a timely filed claim. Part I 
provides a background and general overview of FRCP 15(c) and 
the FfCA. Part II discusses a current circuit split concerning the 
proper application of FRCP 15(c) to FfCA claims, and specifically 
FRCP 15(c)'s limitations period. Part III analyzes this split by con­
sidering various policy goals and objectives set out by Congress 
with respect to FfCA claims, while also examining the purpose and 
subsequent development of FRCP 15(c). Additionally, Part III 
concludes that a bright-line rule of law denying relation back in all 
FfCA claims, regardless of the circumstances, is contrary to the 
principle goals of both FRCP 15(c) and the FfCA. Finally, this 
Note presents a workable approach to dealing with this procedural 
conflict, which evaluates the rights and interests of each party and 
suggests a number of factors that courts and litigants should con­
sider when faced with this thorny and unsettled issue. 
I. BACKGROUND-FRCP 15(c) AND THE FfCA 
A. FRCP 15(c)-From Common Law to Modern Practice 
FRCP 15 facilitates amended and supplemental pleadingsP 
An amended pleading encompasses events or transactions that have 
taken place prior to the filing of the original pleading, while supple­
mental pleadings relate to those events that occur after the original 
filing. 13 FRCP 15(c) indicates circumstances in which amended 
pleadings-filed after the statute of limitations has run on the origi­
nal claim-may "relate back" to the date of the original pleading to 
avoid being time-barred.14 Specifically, FRCP 15(c) provides: 
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the origi­
nal pleading when 
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the 
statute of limitations applicable to the action, or 
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or 
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the 
party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision 
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(2) is satisfied and ... the party to be brought in by amendment 
(A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that 
the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the 
merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mis­
take concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would 
have been brought against the party. IS 
Under this doctrine, "parties may correct technical errors in 
their pleadings, assert a new claim or defense, or change the name 
of the party being sued even after the statute of limitations for as­
serting such claims has expired."16 
1. Relation Back at Common Law 
At common law, courts generally applied one traditional rule 
that governed when an amended claim could relate back to a timely 
filed claim,17 Under this rule, courts permitted the relation back of 
an amended complaint only if it provided more detail or informa­
tion about the original claim, or "amplified" a claim.I8 As such, 
amendments that added a new cause of action were not allowed to 
relate back to the timely filed claim.I9 This narrow application was 
justified on the theory that permitting new causes of action to relate 
15. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c). 
16. Steven S. Sparling, Note, Relation Back of "John Doe" Complaints in Federal 
Court: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1235,1244 (1997) 
(emphasis added); accord Robert D. Brussack, Outrageous Fortune: The Case for 
Amending Rule J5(c) Again, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 674 (1988) ("If an amendment 
relates back it is treated as if it were filed along with the original complaint, even if it 
was actually filed after the expiration of the limitations period."); see FED. R. CIV. P. 
15(c)(2) (asserting new claim or defense); id. 15(c)(3) (changing party name). 
17. Rebecca S. Engrav, Comment, Relation Back of Amendments Naming Previ­
ously Unnamed Defendants Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure J5(c), 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 1549, 1555 (2001). 
18. [d. at 1555-56; see also Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Moffatt, 55 P. 837, 838 (Kan. 1899) 
(permitting amended negligence complaint that added specific ways in which the defen­
dant railroad had been negligent, as "[n]o new cause of action was set forth in the 
amended petition"); Love v. S. Ry. Co., 65 S.W. 475, 476 (Tenn. 1901) (allowing an 
amendment that named new beneficiaries in a wrongful death case, where the original 
complaint only named the administrator, to relate back as "the amendment d[id] not set 
up a new cause of action, or bring in new parties"). 
19. See 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1471 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that, at common law, amendments that added a new cause 
of action or changed the cause of action were not allowed); see also Union Pac. Ry. Co. 
v. Wyler, 158 U.S. 285, 296 (1895) (holding that "from its very reason, [relation back] 
applies only to an amendment which does not create a new cause of action"); Whalen v. 
Gordon, 95 F. 305, 308-09 (8th Cir. 1899) ("[A]n amendment which introduces a new or 
different cause of action, and makes a new or different demand ... does not relate back 
to the beginning of the action ... [and] is the equivalent of a fresh suit upon a new 
cause of action ...."). 
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back denied a defendant his rights under the applicable statute of 
limitations.20 Due to this stringent standard, a considerable amount 
of litigation addressed the definition of "cause of action."21 Addi­
tionally, determining whether an amendment "amplified" the origi­
nal claim, or instead presented a new cause of action, was a 
procedural matter that at times led to harsh results for plaintiffs, 
even "when the amendment would have caused little, if any, sur­
prise or prejudice" to the opposing party.22 
As a result of this perceived injustice, federal courts began to 
broaden the scope of the relation-back doctrine by applying the 
rule in a more liberal fashion?3 Courts began permitting the rela­
tion back of amended claims that modified the original cause of 
action as long as the amendment had the same factual basis as the 
original claim.24 In this circumstance, the amended claim caused no 
surprise or prejudice to the defendant, who was held to be on notice 
of the new cause of action from the outset of the litigation.25 How­
ever, courts were unwilling to further "extend this relaxation" by 
allowing amended claims to add or substitute new parties to the 
action.26 
20. See Whalen, 95 F. at 308 (stating that relation back "is never permitted to 
deprive the adverse party of any legal defense to the claim presented by the amend­
ment, such as that which arises by virtue of the provisions of the statute of limitations"). 
21. Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rule J5(c) and Its Les­
sons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1513 (1987). 
22. Engrav, supra note 17, at 1557. For examples of a narrow application of rela­
tion back at common law leading to harsh results, see Wyler, 158 U.S. at 298 (holding 
that an amendment seeking to change legal theory from negligence to violation of a 
state statute was barred by the statute of limitations, even though the original pleading 
stated the necessary facts relevant to establishing the violation), and Boston & M. R. R. 
v. Hurd, 108 F. 116, 124-25 (1st Cir. 1901) (denying an amendment that sought to 
change a claim based on common law personal injury to statutory wrongful death). 
23. Engrav, supra note 17, at 1557. 
24. Id. The Supreme Court followed this approach when it addressed the rela­
tion-back issue. See, e.g., Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 576 (1913) 
(holding that plaintiff's amended claim, which sought to assert a new federal statutory 
claim, as opposed to the original Kansas state law claim, "introduced no new or differ­
ent cause of action, nor did it set up any different state of facts as the ground of action, 
and therefore it related back to the beginning of the suit"). 
25. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922) 
(holding that "when a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff 
sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the 
reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and ... a liberal rule should be 
applied"). 
26. Clif J. Shapiro, Note, Amendments that Add Plaintiffs Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure J5(c), 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 671,674 (1982); see also Mellon v. Ark. 
Land & Lumber Co., 275 U.S. 460, 463 (1928) (stating that an amendment that added a 
new defendant "was in effect the commencement of a new and independent proceeding 
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2. 	 Codifying FRCP 15(c)-Implementing the Goals of Civil 
Procedure 
The original FRCP 15(c), as promulgated in 1938, abandoned 
the common law "cause-of-action" test in favor of a new standard.27 
The new FRCP 15(c) stated that "[w]henever the claims or defense 
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transac­
tion, or occurrence set forth, or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the 
original pleading."28 In essence, this codified the more liberal ap­
proach to relation back that was applied by federal courts in the 
years leading up to the adoption of FRCP 15(c).29 Notice of the 
amended claim was now an important factor to be used by federal 
courts in determining whether to permit relation back.3D Specifi­
cally, federal courts would permit relation back if the defendant re­
ceived sufficient notice of the new claim to ensure that his defense 
of the action would not be disturbed.31 
As codified, FRCP 15(c) reflects one of the most important 
policies of the Federal Rules-to provide every chance for a claim 
"to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural technicali­
ties."32 Additionally, a liberal application of FRCP 15(c) is in ac­
cord with the application of other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which seek to adjudicate claims in a just and efficient manner.33 
against him"); Hackner v. Guar. Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1941) ("[W]here new 
service of process is required, it would appear that [plaintiff's] claim would not relate 
back to the date of original suit ...."). 
27. 	 Engrav, supra note 17, at 1559. 
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (1938) (emphasis added); see also Shapiro, supra note 
26, at 674 n.22. 
29. Engrav, supra note 17, at 1560; see also 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, 
§ 1471 (stating that due to the Supreme Court's "broad interpretation" of the cause of 
action limitations on amended pleadings, federal courts began to widen the scope of 
permissible amendments as to the applicability of the relation-back doctrine). 
30. 	 Sparling, supra note 16, at 1250. 
31. 	 Id. 
32. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 1471; see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 
178, 181 (1962) ("It is ... entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil 
.Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere technical­
ities."); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the ap­
proach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive 
to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a 
proper decision on the merits."). 
33. 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 15.02[1]. Moore comments: 
Pleadings are not intended to be an end in themselves, but only a means to 
dispose of the controversy. Rule 15, when read in conjunction with other 
rules, fosters this approach. Rule 1 requires a "just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action." Rule 8 requires all pleadings to be construed 
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Even under this liberal approach, amendments that sought to 
add new parties (rather than, or in addition to, new claims) were 
typically denied relation back.34 This result was predicated on the 
theory that amendments adding new parties-filed after the appli­
cable limitations period expired-would deny a defendant his or 
her right to a limitations defense if allowed to relate back.35 The 
limitations defense serves the purpose of ensuring fairness to the 
defendant by preventing the surprise of a claim that has been "dor­
mant for so long that proof, witnesses and memories all, have disap­
peared."36 While this new approach to relation back did increase 
the number of meritorious claims that proceeded to trial, harsh re­
sults were not completely eradicated, as many claims were still de­
feated on purely technical, procedural grounds.37 
These strict rulings frequently occurred in suits by private par­
ties against the government. 38 This was often the result of two fac­
tors: (1) a short limitations period for actions against the 
government,39 and (2) private parties suing an improper federal 
agency, when the real party in interest was the U.S. government.40 
in a manner to do "substantial justice." Rule 61 requires the court to disre­
gard errors or defects that do not affect the substantive rights of the parties. 
Rule 15 provides that amendments should be freely given when justice so re­
quires and that supplemental pleadings should be allowed on reasonable no­
tice and on terms that are just. 
Id. (citations omitted); see FED. R CIv. P. 1. 
34. Sparling, supra note 16, at 1251; see also Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916, 919 
(D. Colo. 1958) (holding that FRCP 15(c) does not enable a new party "to avoid the 
effect of a statutory limitation fixing the time in which the action may be brought"). 
35. Sparling, supra note 16, at 1251. This is based on the premise that the defen­
dant would have had no way of anticipating the new claim being asserted. [d. 
36. Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, 7 F.3d 1067, 1074 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Burnett v. 
N.Y. Cent. RR Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("Statutes of limitations are primarily 
designed to assure fairness to defendants."); 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 15.19[1] 
("The purpose of the statute of limitations is to prevent stale claims."); Shapiro, supra 
note 26, at 672 (discussing how stale claims present defendants with problems of evi­
dence loss, disappearance or death of witnesses, and factual matters being obscured by 
imperfect memories, "any of [which] can greatly prejudice a defendant"). 
37. 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACfICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1498 (2d ed. 1990); see also Davis v. L.L. Cohen & Co., 268 U.S. 638, 640 (1925) 
(stating that an "amendment of writ and declaration ... by substituting the designated 
Agent as the defendant, was, in effect, the commencement of a new and independent 
proceeding"); Robbins v. Esso Shipping Co., 190 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) 
("[I]f the effect of the amendment is to substitute for the defendant a new party, such 
amendment amounts to a new and independent cause of action and cannot be permit­
ted when the statute of limitations has run."). 
38. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 1502. 
39. Id. 
40. See Cohn v. Fed. Sec. Admin., 199 F. Supp. 884 (W.D.N.Y. 1961). In Cohn, 
the plaintiff made timely service and institution of an action against the United States, 
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The strict dismissal of claims based on technical errors was demon­
strated by a series of FICA claims involving the U.S. Post Office 
Department.41 The plaintiffs, who were injured by the alleged mis­
conduct of post office employees, often misnamed the U.S. Post Of­
fice Department as the defendant in their FICA claim, when the 
U.S. government was the real party in interest.42 Unfortunately for 
the plaintiffs, if their amended complaints were filed after the appli­
cable limitations period, a strict application of the relation-back 
doctrine led to the dismissal of their otherwise meritorious claims.43 
FRCP 15(c) was amended in 1966 in order to address this harsh 
result,44 as well as to establish uniformity with respect to the "spo­
radic" application that relation back was then receiving.45 
3. 	 1966 Amendments to FRCP 1S(c)-The Scope Is 
Broadened 
FRCP 1S(c) was amended in 1966 to establish the specific con­
ditions that permit the relation back of amended complaints that 
however her complaint "failed to join the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
who [was] an indispensable party to the action." Id. at 885. The district court refused 
the plaintiff's motion for leave to serve an amended complaint to substitute the proper 
party for the defendant originally named, holding that "changing the name of the defen­
dant to the present Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare would amount to the 
commencement of a new proceeding and would not relate back in time so as to avoid 
the statutory [limitations] provision." /d. 
41. 	 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 1502. 
42. Id. at 146; see also Lomax v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 354 (D. Pa. 1957). In 
Lomax, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the U.S. Post Office Department to re­
cover damages for injuries he sustained due to a postal employee's alleged negligent 
operation of a post office vehicle. Id. at 356. Upon obtaining advice from counsel that 
the proper defendant was the United States (and not the U.S. Post Office Department), 
the plaintiff amended the complaint to substitute the United States as the party-defen­
dant. /d. This amendment occurred more than two years after the action accrued. Id. 
The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss, reasoning that "while it 
may seem harsh to deprive the plaintiff of his remedy because of his error in instituting 
his action against the wrong party," the amended complaint was time-barred by the 
flCA's statute of limitations. Id. at 359. 
43. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 1502. The dismissal of these claims was 
"soundly criticized on the ground that [it] deprived plaintiff of an adjudication of the 
controversy's merits solely because of a technical pleading error." Id. at 164. 
44. "Clarification of the application of the relation back doctrine to suits against 
the United States by private parties was a very important objective of the 1966 amend­
ment to FRCP 15(c) because it was in this context that harsh results frequently were 
reached." Id. at 163. 
45. Engrav, supra note 17, at 1561 (noting the rule was amended to address in­
consistencies that existed when courts were applying relation back); see also FED. R. 
CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee's notes on the 1966 amendments (stating that incor­
rect criteria was occasionally applied by courts when addressing relation back of 
amended claims, "leading sporadically to doubtful results"). 
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add or change parties to the original action.46 To achieve this re­
sult, a second sentence was added to the rule, stating that an 
amendment changing or adding a party may relate back if the op­
posing party both received adequate notice of the claim and knew 
or should have known that the action would have been initiated 
against him.47 
Taken as a whole, the amended FRCP 15(c) expanded the cov­
erage of the relation-back doctrine.48 In keeping with the trend to­
ward liberal pleading, plaintiffs no longer had to worry about the 
dismissal of meritorious claims for failing to properly name the de­
fendant. 49 Furthermore, while the rule was amended in large part 
to prevent the harsh outcomes resulting from complaints which 
originally named improper defendants, the Advisory Committee 
noted, "the attitude taken in revised FRCP 15(c) toward change of 
defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing plain­
tiffs."50 Most courts and commentators agreed that the critical 
component of amended FRCP 15(c) was notice-specifically 
whether the original pleading gave the defendant adequate notice 
of the claims or parties he needed to defend against. 51 
46. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.27, at 307 (3d ed. 1999); 
see also FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c) advisory committee's notes on the 1966 amendments. 
The advisory committee's notes on the 1966 amendments to FRCP 15(c) state: 
FRCP 15(c) [was] amplified to state more clearly when an amendment of a 
pleading changing the party against whom a claim is asserted (including an 
amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant) shall "re­
late back" to the date of the original pleading. The problem has arisen most 
acutely in certain actions by private parties against officers or agencies of the 
United States. 
Id. 
47. Specifically, the rule reads: 
[T]he amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom 
a claim is asserted if ... the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has 
received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be 
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should 
have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, 
the action would have been brought against the party. 
FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c)(3). 
48. Sparling, supra note 16, at 1252. 
49. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 46, § 5.27, at 308-09. 
50. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c) advisory committee's notes on 1966 amendments; see 
Shapiro, supra note 26, at 678. 
51. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 678; see Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236 
(5th Cir. 1968) (holding that "notice is the critical element involved in Rule 15(c) 
determinations"). 
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B. The FTCA 
The FfCA, enacted by Congress in 1946, permits private par­
ties to sue the U.S. government for most torts committed by federal 
employees acting on behalf of the United States.52 The FfCA im­
poses liability for injuries caused by the negligent acts of govern­
ment employees while acting within the scope of their 
employment.53 By permitting individuals to bring claims against 
the federal government, the FfCA expressly waives the sovereign 
immunity of the United States from legal actions sounding in tort.54 
The theory that the United States, as a sovereign nation, is immune 
from legal claims to which it does not expressly consent is rooted in 
the tradition of governmental immunity. 55 
1. 	 Traditional Sovereign Immunity 
a. 	 History of sovereign immunity the context of the English 
feudal system 
The theory that the sovereign was immune from liability for 
tortious acts stems from the English axiom that "the King can do no 
52. 28 U.S.c. § 1346 (2000); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971). In addition to simple negligence claims, the FfeA covers 
medical malpractice, trespass, and claims arising out of arrests by federal law enforce­
ment officers. Jonathan A. Willens, Nat'l Inst. for Trial Advocacy, Commentary, 28 
U.S.C.S. §§ 2671-2680, at 209-10 (2005), available at 28 US NITA 2671 (LEXIS). How­
ever, the FfeA expressly excepts several negligence claims. See 28 U.S.c. § 2680 (bar­
ring claims such as negligent transmission of mail, errors in tax collection, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, and others). 
53. The statute provides: 

[I]njury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent 

or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting 

within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the 

United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accor­

dance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 

28 U.S.c. § 1346(b)(1). "Employee of the Government includes ... employees of [fed­
eral agencies], members of the military or naval forces of the United States, members of 
the National Guard ... and [those] acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official 
capacity ...." Id. § 2671. 
54. 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b)(1); see also Elana Wexler, Note, Section 2401(B) Recon­
figured: Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs Leads to the Right Result for the 
Wrong Reasons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2927, 2928 (2006) ("It is well settled that the 
United States, as a sovereign nation, is immune from suit unless it specifically consents 
to be sued. The [FfeA] expressly waives the United States's [sic] immunity from suits 
in tort ...." (citation omitted)). 
55. Wexler, supra note 54, at 2928; see United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 
586 (1941) ("The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to 
be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdic­
tion to entertain the suit." (citations omitted)). 
233 2007] SEEKING REDRESS AGAINST THE SOVEREIGN 
wrong. "56 While it was well-recognized by the fourteenth century 
that the king could himself commit an illegal act, the structure of 
the English feudal system was such that a king was immune from 
suit.57 Even as the feudal system began to wane, and the king's 
dominance receded, "the fiction of the unity of crown and state per­
sisted, and the fact that the king traditionally had not been subject 
to judicial sanctions provided a foundation for the doctrine of im­
munity for the English government."58 While certain remedies 
slowly developed to aid English citizens seeking relief against the 
crown, tortious acts could never be directly attributed to the king 
himself.59 
b. 	 Adoption and criticisms of the U.S. sovereign immunity 
doctrine 
Scholars have noted that it is "a bit hard to understand" the 
precise legal principles that the United States relied upon when it 
adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity.60 Though on some­
what uncertain grounds, the Supreme Court upheld the theory of 
governmental immunity in a series of decisions during the nine­
teenth century.61 Following this line of cases, it soon became set­
tled law that the government was free from liability unless it gave 
56. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 131, at 970; see United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 
486 (1879). 
57. Under this system, the lord of each manor would hold court for his subjects, 
but was never himself subject to the jurisdiction of his own court. Instead, a lord was 
subject only to the court of a higher noble in the feudal pyramid. As the king was at the 
top of the pyramid, he was subject to no higher noble, and thus, no court at all, leading 
to his status as immune from suits. Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the 
United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 829 (1957) [hereinafter 
Developments]. 
58. 	 !d. at 830. 
59. Over the course of the sixteenth century, a new principle emerged that per­
mitted citizens who were harmed by the king's agents to seek redress against that of­
ficer in an individual capacity. Id. Recognized as the officer's suit in damages, this 
remedy permitted actions "against officers who acted outside their legal authority or 
who failed to execute their official duties; the consent of the sovereign was not re­
quired." Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 597, 605 (1982). 
60. 	 PROSSER, supra note 52, § 131, at 971; Developments, supra note 57, at 830. 
61. Developments, supra note 57, at 830. "[T]he Court defended the doctrine of 
immunity on the ground that it was vital for the efficient operation of the Govern­
ment." Id. However, this "anomalous acceptance" of the doctrine was applied by the 
Court "seemingly without any attempt at justification." !d.; see, e.g., Hill v. United 
States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850) (applying the doctrine based on the fact that it 
had been "universally assented to"); see also United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 
How.) 286 (1846); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
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consent to be sued.62 Justice Holmes opined: "A sovereign is ex­
empt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete 
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no 
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the 
right depends. "63 
Although sovereign immunity had a long history within the 
English feudal system, some scholars argued that it should not ap­
ply in the United States' nonfeudal system of government.64 This 
debate was predicated on the different manner in which the sover­
eign is placed within the United States' governmental structure as 
opposed to the English governmental structure.65 Under the En­
glish feudal structure the king "was a personal ruler and the foun­
tain of justice," and thus was exempt from the jurisdiction of any 
court.66 However, the U.S. government was founded on the princi­
ple that no governmental body, not even the Executive, is above 
the law.67 Instead, American government exists separate and apart 
from the sovereign.68 As such, disapproval of the doctrine often 
focuses on the fact that it applies a traditional, feudal concept to 
our own federal government.69 
Furthermore, "[a]s the role of federal government expanded" 
the number of federal employees also increased-inevitably leading 
to a greater number of tortious acts committed by these individu­
als'?o However, as a result of the judicial branch's adoption of sov­
62. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 131, at 971. 
63. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,353 (1907); see also PROSSER, supra 
note 52, § 131 n.14. 
64. Wexler, supra note 54, at 2933; Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsi­
bility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1926). 
65. Borchard, supra note 64, at 38. 
66. Id. 
67. As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky states, "The effect of sovereign immunity is 
to place the government above the law and to ensure that some individuals who have 
suffered egregious harms will be unable to receive redress for their injuries." Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State 
Sovereign Immunity: Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001). 
68. Borchard, supra note 64, at 38. According to Borchard, sovereign immunity 
"was introduced into the United States after American independence, notwithstanding 
that the [United States] has from the beginning been separated from government and 
... has been deemed merely an agent of the sovereign." Id. 
69. Wexler, supra note 54, at 2933. 
70. /d.; see also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950) ("As the Fed­
eral Government expanded its activities, its agents caused a mUltiplying number of rem­
ediless wrongs-wrongs which would have been actionable if inflicted by an individual 
or a corporation but remediless solely because their perpetrator was an officer or em­
ployee of the Government. "). 
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ereign immunity, injured plaintiffs could not bring lawsuits against 
the federal government under a theory of vicarious liability.7l 
Even so, tort victims who were injured by government employ­
ees could seek relief by applying to Congress for private bills of 
relief.72 However, "the process was expensive for [injured plain­
tiffs] and burdensome to Congress."73 In fact, the process of adju­
dicating these claims by way of private relief bills was viewed by 
many in Congress as nothing short of "unsatisfactory, and an out­
right failure."74 Additionally, as the government expanded, Con­
71. Wexler, supra note 54, at 2933. Vicarious liability is "[l]iability that a supervi­
sory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or 
associate (such as an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (8th ed. 2004). For a discussion on the application of 
vicarious liability, see PROSSER, supra note 52, § 69, and see also RESTATEMENT (SEC­
OND) OF AGENCY, § 216 (1958) ("A master or other principal may be liable to another 
whose interests have been invaded by the tortious conduct of a servant or other agent, 
although the principal does not personally violate a duty to such other or authorize the 
conduct of the agent causing the invasion."). 
72. Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort 
Claims Act: Putting the Legislative History in Proper Perspective, 31 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 174, 189 (2000). The private bill consisted of a congressional proposal that would 
either provide compensation to an injured party or provide the claimant with a jurisdic­
tional ticket to adjudicate the claim. Id. Private relief bills involve petitioning Congress 
to provide benefits or relief to specified individuals. This measure is often used when 
administrative or legal remedies are exhausted. For more information on the legislative 
process regarding private bills, including measures used to introduce the bills, and com­
mittee and floor considerations, see RICHARD S. BETH, PRIVATE BILLS: PROCEDURE IN 
THE HOUSE (1998), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98-628.htm. 
73. Wexler, supra note 54, at 2933. According to Justice Jackson, "[t]he volume 
of these private bills, the inadequacy of congressional machinery for determination of 
facts, the importunities to which claimants subjected members of Congress, and the 
capricious results, led to a strong demand that claims for tort wrongs be submitted to 
adjudication." Feres, 340 U.S. at 140; see also Irvin M. Gottlieb, Tort Claims Against the 
United States, 30 GEO. L.J. 462, 464-65 n.16 (1942) (specifically discussing the statistics 
of the private bills procedure and noting the burden placed on Congress with a prepon­
derance of diminutive claims). 
74. Gottlieb, supra note 73, at 464 (noting that given the expanding role of the 
federal government into "the life of every citizen in such an intimate manner," a waiver 
of liability for tortious conduct "constitutes a patent injustice to bona fide claimants"); 
see also Daniel Shane Read, The Courts' Difficult Balancing Act to be Fair to Both 
Plaintiff and Government Under the FTCA's Administrative Claims Process, 57 BAYLOR 
L. 	REV. 785, 789 (2005). Read states: 
As decades passed, the process of private citizens petitioning Congress for leg­
islation for relief from wrongs done by federal employees proved unworkable. 
The number of claims taxed Congress's time and Congress was ill-suited for 
the task of administering justice. President Franklin Roosevelt commented in 
1942 that during the last three Congresses, almost 6,300 private claim bills 
were introduced, less than twenty percent of which became law, and that of all 
the Presidential vetoes during those Congresses, one-third were made up of 
private claim bills. The President also noted that the existing Congressional 
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gress began to waive its sovereign immunity in various 
circumstances, including suits against the government sounding in 
contract and certain admiralty and maritime torts.15 The growing 
dissatisfaction surrounding the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
coupled with Congress's partial waiver of immunity in certain situa­
tions, demonstrated that legislation was needed to eliminate gov­
ernmental immunity from suit for acts committed by its federal 
employees.16 As a result, Congress passed the FICA in 1946, waiv­
ing the government's sovereign immunity from tort liability.77 
2. FICA's Statute of Limitations Provisions 
a. Original limitations period 
The purpose of the FICA was to create an equitable remedy 
for those who were injured by federal employees working in their 
governmental capacity.18 The FICA also sought to balance this ob­
jective with the congressional "interest in limiting the burdensome 
[private claim] process."79 As originally enacted in 1946, the FICA 
demanded that claimants bring their tort claims against the govern-
procedure for tort relief was "slow, expensive, and unfair both to the Congress 
and to the claimant." 
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, SIMPLIFICATION OF PROCE­
DURE REGARDING HANDLING OF SMALL CLAIMS AND CONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGES, 
H.R. Doc. No. 77-562, at 2 (1942), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
print.php?pid=16275). 
75. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 131, at 971 ("[W]ith the establishment of a Court of 
Claims [in 1855] to hear contract cases, and various other minor provisions permitting 
even some actions in tort, a measure of relief was obtainable for those with grievances 
against the United States."); see Wexler, supra note 54, at 2935 (noting that in the 
1920s, Congress waived governmental immunity with respect to admiralty and maritime 
torts); see also Feres, 340 U.S. at 139 ("The Tort Claims Act was not an isolated and 
spontaneous flash of congressional generosity. It marks the culmination of a long effort 
to mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit. "). For a detailed dis­
cussion of federal statutes permitting tort actions against the government prior to the 
enactment of the FTCA, see JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT 
CLAIMS § 2.05 (1994). 
76. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 131, at 972. 
77. !d. 
78. S. REP. No. 79-1400, at 30 (1946); see also Developments, supra note 57, at 887 
("The most important consideration supporting a waiver of sovereign immunity is the 
inequity of not compensating for injuries suffered through the fault of government 
employees. "). 
79. Wexler, supra note 54, at 2936; see also Developments, supra note 57, at 889 
("From the legislative history of the FTCA ... it is clear that one of Congress' primary 
motives was to remove from its calendars the many private bills resulting from the 
absence of a judicial remedy."). 
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ment within one year after the claims accrued.80 This relatively 
short statute of limitations was deemed by some as necessary to 
protect the government's interest of the government in defending 
against stale claims, given that claimants could still use the tradi­
tional remedial method of petitioning Congress for a private bill of 
relief.81 However, for many plaintiffs, this one-year limitations pe­
riod simply proved too short.82 
b. 	 The 1949 amendment-extending the limitations period to two 
years 
Between the years 1946 and 1949, many flCA claimants saw 
their actions dismissed pursuant to the strict construction of the 
one-year limitations period.83 This was especially true of victims 
whose injuries did not fully develop until after this one-year time 
frame.84 Additionally, due to the delays in government communi­
cation that existed at this time, particularly in the armed services, 
there was a likelihood that a wrongful death notification to the next 
of kin would arrive at a time when the running of the statute had 
already barred the filing of an flCA claim.85 Furthermore, as 
Congress began to review the limitations periods of other state and 
federal tort statutes, it concluded that the one-year limitations pe­
riod was out of touch with the state and federal legislative 
landscape.86 
Accordingly, in 1949 Congress amended the flCA's limita­
tions period by extending it to two years.87 This was an attempt to 
balance the federal government's goal of providing tort claimants 
with their day in court, while protecting the government's defense 
80. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601,60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 28 u.s.c. § 2401(b) (2000)). 
81. Bain & Colella, supra note 72, at 193. Judge Alexander HoItzoff, acting as 
Special Assistant to Attorney General Frank Murphy, testified before the Senate Judi­
ciary Committee, remarking: 
It seemed to us that a short statute of limitations, such as 1 year, is necessary 
for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Government, and is not un­
fair to the claimant, because the lawyer of the claimant should be able to bring 
this suit within 1 year after the cause of action has accrued. 
Id. (quoting Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Congo 38 (1940)). 
82. 	 Id. at 197. 
83. 	 Id. 
84. 	 H.R. REP. No. 81-276, at 4 (1949). 
85. 	 Bain & Colella, supra note 72, at 197-98 (citing H.R. REP. No. 81-276, at 2-4). 
86. 	 H.R. REP. No. 81-276, at 2-4. 
87. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 81-55, 63 Stat. 62,62 (1949) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.c. § 2401(b) (2000)). 
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against stale claims. "The period of 2 years proposed in the bill 
represent[ ed] a happy medium which has been tested and found 
satisfactory in the laboratory of legal experience. "88 
c. 	 Congress again amends the FTCA's limitations provision in 
1966 
Soon after the FfCA was enacted, the government realized 
that most tort claims filed against it could be settled in pre-trial ne­
gotiations, obviating the need to resort to expensive and time-con­
suming judicial processes.89 Congress noted that approximately 
eighty percent of the meritorious FfCA claims filed in 1965 were 
settled prior to tria1.90 Legislators believed that permitting federal 
agencies to settle a substantial number of these claims, as opposed 
to the Department of Justice, would be a more efficient use of gov­
ernment resources.91 Therefore, in 1966 Congress enacted legisla­
tion that imposed a "mandatory administrative-exhaustion 
procedure" on all FfCA claimants.92 Under the new process, 
claimants first had to present their tort claims to the responsible 
administrative agencies whose employees' wrongful conduct gave 
rise to the claim, for possible settlement prior to filing suit.93 
This "exhaustion provision" precluded claimants from filing an 
action against the government pursuant to the FfCA for six 
months, as the action first had to be presented to the proper admin­
istrative agency.94 If the agency did not deny or settle the claim 
88. H.R. REp. No. 81-276, at 4; see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 
117 (1979). 
89. Ugo Colella, The Case for Borrowing a Limitations Period for Deemed-Denial 
Suits Brought Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 391, 398 
(1998). 
90. Read, supra note 74, at 791. Specifically, Congress pointed out: 
In the fiscal year 1965, the [government] settled 731 tort cases after suit had 
been instituted ... for a total of $6 million. Where the cases resulted in judg­
ment against the Government, the record for the same year showed that there 
were 169 judgments which totaled approximately $4 million.... Therefore, it 
is established that of the meritorious [FTCA] claims filed against the Govern­
ment ... about 80 percent are settled prior to actual trial. 
S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 2-3 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2516. 
91. 	 Read, supra note 74, at 9l. 
92. 	 28 U.S.c. § 2675(a); see also Colella, supra note 89, at 398. 
93. 28 U.S.c. § 2675(a). This administrative claim must be filed with the respon­
sible agency within two years after the claim accrues. Id. § 2401(b). 
94. Id. § 2675(a). Specifically, the provision reads: 
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for 
money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death 
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
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upon the expiration of this six-month period, Congress gave claim­
ants the choice to either negotiate further with the agency until the 
claim was resolved, or deem the claim denied and file suit in federal 
court.95 However, once the agency denied the claim, the claimant 
was required to file suit in the district court within six months.96 
This new administrative requirement was intended by Congress "to 
expedite the resolution of tort claims brought against the United 
States."97 Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees agreed 
that the new procedure would reduce the number of stale claims 
that the government would need to address.98 
As a result of the administrative filing requirement, claimants 
must first deal with the appropriate administrative agency, irrespec­
tive of the extent of the alleged injury or amount of damages 
sought.99 While a great deal of litigation has surrounded what actu­
ally constitutes effective notice of an administrative claim,lOo the 
language of the flCA's limitations period requires that notification 
be given to the proper federal agency in writing, accompanied by a 
claim for monetary damages for property or personal injury.101 
Proper notification of the claim permits the appropriate administra-
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless 
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal 
agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing 
.... The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six 
months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, 
be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. 
Id. The purpose of the administrative claim requirement is to allow the government a 
procedure by which it can "investigate, evaluate, and consider settlement of a claim. 
This purpose requires that the claimant provide sufficient information to permit the 
government agency both to conduct a meaningful investigation of the incident and to 
estimate the claim's worth." Willens, supra note 52, at 353. 
95. 28 U.S.c. § 2675(a); see also Colella, supra note 89, at 398. 
96. "A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred ... unless 
action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered 
mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented." 28 
U.S.c. § 2401(b). 
97. Bain & Colella, supra note 72, at 201. 
98. Id. 
99. Donald N. Zillman, Maritime Personal Injury: Presenting a Claim Under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 43 LA. L. REV. 961, 967 (1983). 
100. Id. Most of the cases that involve litigation over the notice requirement in­
volve claimants who were not actually intending to meet the administrative filing re­
quirement from the outset. Id. at 971. "Rather, the cases suggest that the plaintiff 
discovered the jurisdictional requirement of an administrative claim only after filing suit 
and was attempting to discover some previous action that would qualify as a presenta­
tion of an administrative claim. Courts generally have been unsympathetic to these 
creative presentation efforts." Id. 
101. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (2006). 
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tive agency to investigate the matter and assess whether there is 
merit to the allegations.102 Determining the merit of the adminis­
trative claim is an essential component of the administrative filing 
requirement, as it furthers the legislative goal of settling FfCA 
claims, thereby avoiding costly litigation.103 
II. THE ApPLICATION OF FRCP 15(c) TO CLAIMS BROUGHT 

PURSUANT TO THE FfCA-THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT 

A. Permitting Relation Back in FTCA Claims 
One of the most important policies of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure is to ensure that claimants get their day in court, 
rather than have meritorious claims dismissed on procedural techni­
calities. l04 In Conley v. Gibson, Justice Black opined for a unani­
mous Court that "[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach that 
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be 
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of 
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."105 Soon 
after Justice Black articulated this liberal approach to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
applied FRCP 15(c) with this "required liberality" in Williams v. 
United States .106 
In Williams, Louise J. Smyre, as next friend,107 brought a suit 
pursuant to the FfCA against the United States for her minor son's 
personal injuries, which resulted "from the explosion of an Army 
M-80 firecracker."108 After the statute of limitations had expired 
102. George A. Bermann, Federal Tort Claims at the Agency Level: The FTCA 
Administrative Process, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 563-64 (1985). 
103. See infra Part III.B.2; see also Bermann, supra note 102, at 531. Bermann 
notes that 
Congress clearly intended by the 1966 amendments to encourage and fa­
cilitate administrative disposition of tort claims. Thus, if the original Act was 
designed to ease the burdens on Congress by shifting primary responsibility 
for government tort claims to the courts, the 1966 amendments sought in turn 
to transfer the burden to the agencies. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
104. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 1471. 
105. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (noting that the pleading proce­
dures shall be liberally "construed as to do substantial justice" (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 
8(f))). 
106. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1968). 
107. In a next friend claim, "[a] person ... appears in a lawsuit to act for the 
benefit of an incompetent or minor plaintiff, but ... is not a party to the lawsuit and is 
not appointed as a guardian." BLACK'S LAW DlCnONARY, supra note 71, at 1070. 
108. Williams, 405 F.2d at 235. 
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on this claim, "Smyre, who had long been in the case as next 
friend-sought leave to amend the [original] complaint to appear as 
a party plaintiff in her own right, [seeking] recovery for loss of ser­
vices.''109 Naturally, "[t]he Government [challenged] this proffered 
amendment on the ground that it ... was [time-]barred by the 
[FICA's] statute of limitations."l1o Reasoning that the doctrine of 
relation back under FRCP 15(c) was to be "liberally applied in Fed­
eral Courts,"111 the Fifth Circuit held that "[c]learly notice is the 
critical element involved in Rule 15(c) determinations."112 Apply­
ing this standard, the court determined that because the injury to a 
minor under these circumstances would typically give rise to an in­
jury to the parent, this claim "reasonably indicate[ d] a likelihood 
that the parent would incur losses of a recoverable kind," and as 
such the government was put on notice of the parent's claim at the 
outset of the litigation.!13 The court held that, assuming proper no­
tice was given, permitting relation back would not be prejudicial to 
the government.114 
Several years later, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
also addressed the issue of the applicability of FRCP 15( c) to tardy 
FICA claims in Avila v. INS. 115 As in Williams, the court over­
turned a lower court's decision and permitted a father, Jesus 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 236. 
112. Id. ("Rule 15(c) is 'based on the idea that a party who is notified of litigation 
concerning a given transaction or occurrence is entitled to no more protection from 
statutes of limitations than one who is informed of the precise legal description of the 
rights sought to be enforced.'" (quoting 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrlCE <JI 15.15[2], at 
1021». 
113. Id. at 239. The court noted that, 

This [notice requirement] becomes of special importance in situations in which 

a common set of operational facts gives rise to distinct claims (or defenses) 

among distinct claimants (or defendants). A ready illustration is a personal 

injury resulting later in death with (a) the individual's claim for lifetime pain, 

suffering and loss of earnings, etc. (b) the survival of (a) to his personal repre­

sentative and (c) the pecuniary loss sustained by the decedent's dependents 

because of his death. 
Id. at 238. 
114. Id. at 238; see also Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Statute of Limitations 
Under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.c.A. § 2401 (b)) , 29 A.L.R. FED. 482 (1976). 
115. Avila v. INS, 731 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1984). In Avila, father Jesus Cardona 
filed an action pursuant to the FICA on behalf of his mentally impaired son, Daniel 
Cardona, seeking damages for an alleged wrongful deportation of the latter. Id. at 618. 
After the two-year limitations period ran on this original claim, Jesus sought to amend 
the claim by adding himself as a claimant and detailing his personal expenses incurred 
in his searched for his son. Id. The district court dismissed this amended claim. Id. 
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Cardona, to amend a claim originally filed on behalf of his son, 
Daniel, after the two-year limitations period had run.116 Relying on 
the rationale set forth in Williams, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals held that "[i]n deciding whether an amendment relates back 
to the original claim, notice to the opposing party of the existence 
and involvement of the new plaintiff is the critical element."117 Ap­
plying this standard, the court ruled that the government would in­
cur no prejudice from permitting relation back of Jesus Cardona's 
claim, as the original complaint both put the government on notice 
of the fact that he was Daniel's father and explained the resulting 
damages sustained by his son.llB 
B. 	 Refusing to Extend FRCP J5(c) to FTCA Claims-Splitting 
the Circuits 
The Supreme Court has held that conditions placed on the fed­
eral government's waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly 
observed.119 Accordingly, when construing the FICA's statute of 
limitations provision, the Court has been careful to apply this 
waiver in accordance with congressional intent.120 When the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether 
FRCP 15(c) was applicable to a claim brought pursuant to the 
FICA, it used this strict sovereign immunity canon of construction 
to hold that relation back was effectively inapplicable to the 
FICA's limitations period.121 Additionally, the court supported its 
new bright-line rule of law with its interpretation of the history and 
legislative goals of the 1966 amendments to the FICA.u2 
116. 	 Id. at 619. 
117. 	 Id. at 620; see also Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 1308 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that, "[a]s the Advisory Committee note [to the 1966 amend­
ment of FRCP 15(c)] suggests[,] ... it is clear that the crucial policy underlying the rule 
is notice to the party opposing the amendment" (citation omitted)). 
118. Avila, 731 F.2d at 620. In particular, the court stated that "[t]he nature of 
Jesus' damages was such that the government would reasonably expect [them] to occur 
from its wrongful deportation of a mentally impaired citizen." Id. 
119. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957) (noting that "this Court 
has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents 
to be sued must be strictly observed"). 
120. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979) ("[T]he [FTCA] waives 
the immunity of the United States and ... in construing the statute of limitations, which 
is a condition of that waiver, we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver 
beyond that which Congress intended."). 
121. 	 Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831, 840-42 (8th Cir. 1987). 
122. 	 Id. at 841. 
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In Manko v. United States, the court was faced with whether a 
belatedly amended FTCA complaint, seeking to introduce plain­
tiff's wife as a co-plaintiff in order to assert a new loss of consor­
tium cause of action, related back to the date of the original 
claim.123 Affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of Ap­
peals for the Eighth Circuit held that the application of FRCP 15(c) 
to the amended claim was improperP4 Quoting Kubrick, the court 
pointed out that the FTCA limitations provision was "'the balance 
struck by Congress in the context of tort claims against the Govern­
ment,''' with the purpose of "'encourag[ing] the prompt presenta­
tion of claims.' "125 As such, strictly construing the FTCA's statute 
of limitations and not permitting relation back was in accordance 
with the fact that the FTCA's statute of limitations "is a condition 
of waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States."126 
Furthermore, although the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit recognized that the government could not distinguish the 
facts presented from those in Avila,127 it declined to follow the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's holding on the ground that 
its reasoning was flawed.128 The Eighth Circuit argued that the 
Avila court's reliance on Williams was improper because Williams 
was decided prior to the 1966 amendments to the FTCA, which es­
tablished the administrative-claims system to help settle FTCA 
claims.129 As such, the court "believe[ d] the result in Avila [was] at 
odds with the congressional purpose underlying § 2401(b) because 
... amendments which add new claims or increase the amount of 
damages sought change the government's settlement calculus. "130 
123. Id. at 838-39. In Manko, husband Louis H. Manko brought a claim against 
the United States pursuant to the FICA for injuries stemming from a swine flu immuni­
zation. /d. at 834. After the limitations period had run on this claim, Mr. Manko's 
wife, Sylvia Manko, sought to join the action in order to assert a claim for loss of con­
sortium. Id. at 838. After this was denied, Mr. Manko attempted to amend his timely 
filed claim and name his wife as a co-plaintiff in order to have it relate back to the 
original filing date. Id. This claim was denied on the ground that it was time-barred by 
the FICA's statute of limitations. Id. 
124. Id. at 841-42. 
125. Id. at 839 (quoting Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117). 
126. Id. at 842. 
127. Id. at 841. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id.; see also Lee v. United States, 980 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992). In Lee, the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adhered to the holding articulated in Manko 
when faced with the issue of whether an amended FICA claim may relate back to an 
original timely claim. Id. at 1341. The court reasoned that the legislative history of the 
FICA demonstrated a congressional intent "to create a system by which an administra­
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Permitting relation back of these amended claims, which was cer­
tain to increase the total damage award sought by the plaintiff, 
would unfairly disrupt this "settlement calculus" as the new parties 
or claims would not have been factored into the government's ini­
tial settlement equation.l3l Therefore, the court found that Avila 
was not good authority on the issue of relation back of FTCA 
claims.132 
Recently, the District Court for the Eastern District of Ken­
tucky also addressed this issue in Withrow v. United States, and set 
out the current circuit split over the application of FRCP 15(c) to 
amended claims filed pursuant to the FTCA.133 Detailing the con­
gressional intent with respect to the FTCA's statute of limita­
tions,134 and noting the sovereign immunity justification for 
narrowly construing the limitations period,135 the court held the 
new loss of consortium claim asserted by the plaintiff was time­
barred.B6 Furthermore, the court noted that while the strict appli­
cation of statutes of limitations sometimes defeats otherwise valid 
claims, "that is their very purpose, and they remain as ubiquitous as 
the statutory rights or other rights to which they are attached or are 
applicable."137 Although noting that it is not the intention of the 
government to deprive injured tort victims of their day in court, the 
tive agency could resolve 'specific claims for specific amounts of money.'" Id. (quoting 
Manko, 830 F.2d at 840). As such, "[a]llowing the [plaintiff's] amended complaint in 
this case would ... violate congressional intent to create a system for administrative 
agencies dealing with specific claims. For all these reasons, the [plaintiff's] claim cannot 
relate back to the original claim." Id. 
131. Manko, 830 F.2d at 841. 
132. Id. 
133. Withrow v. United States, No. Civ. A. 5:05-152-JMH, 2005 WL 2403730 
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2005). In Withrow, decedent Thomas Withrow's spouse, Thelma 
Withrow, brought an action against the United States (pursuant to the FICA) for 
wrongful death damages. Id. at *1. This original action listed Mrs. Withrow as the only 
claimant, and did not mention loss of consortium damages. More than a year later, 
after the limitations period had run on this claim, Mrs. Withrow filed an amended claim 
that added her children as claimants and new loss of consortium damages. Id. at *2. 
The United States moved to dismiss these new claims, and the district court granted the 
motion on the grounds that the limitations period had run and the tardy claims did not 
relate back to the original timely filed claim. Id. 
134. [d. at *6 ("If the Court permitted relation back in this matter, the Court 
would be frustrating the balance struck by Congress in enacting the two-year statute of 
limitations. "). 
135. Id. ("Another equally compelling reason to deny relation back is that the 
FICA is a waiver of sovereign immunity and, consequently, should be strictly 
construed. "). 
136. Id. at *8. 
137. Id. at *6 (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979)). 
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court nonetheless adopted the reasoning of the Courts of Appeals 
for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and held that relation back was 
not permissible with respect to FTCA claims.138 
III. ANALYSIS 
With the current split in the federal courts of appeals, litigants 
like Catherine Deegan Patterson and Yvonne Deegan Gioka are 
left to wonder whether their amended FTCA claims will be permit­
ted to relate back to an original timely filed claim.139 Courts will 
naturally tend to adhere to bright-line rules rather than ad hoc ap­
proaches when applying a statute of limitations, as they are easy to 
apply and lead to more predictable outcomes.140 However, these 
judicial tendencies must be balanced against the rights of injured 
claimants with legitimate claims of fault against the government. 
The remainder of this Note analyzes the legal tension that ex­
ists when litigants attempt to apply FRCP 15(c) to FTCA claims. 
Therefore, the underlying goals and objectives of the FTCA will 
first be examined. These objectives demonstrate that the reliance 
on outdated principles of sovereign immunity is not important 
enough to outweigh the primary purpose of the FTCA: providing a 
remedy for citizens injured by tortious acts of the government.141 
Additionally, the legislative goals of the 1966 amendments to the 
FTCA will also be scrutinized, and shown to support the argument 
that the FTCA was passed in order to make the process by which 
claimants can collect for governmental tortious actions more equi­
table and expeditious to them. Next, this Note will discuss the orig­
inal purpose and subsequent development of FRCP 15(c), along 
with its liberalizing 1966 amendments, and will argue that a bright­
138. Id. ("Permitting relation back would be contrary to the purposes of the 
FICA, which are to encourage prompt resolution and settlement of specific claims. As 
the Tenth Circuit held, allowing the amended administrative claim in this matter 'would 
... violate congressional intent to create a system for administrative agencies dealing 
with specific claims.'" (quoting Lee v. United States, 980 F.2d 1337, 1341 (10th Cir. 
1992»). 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9. 
140. DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 677 A.2d 73, 76 (Md. 1996) (noting that 
"[o]bjective standards and bright-line rules such as statutes of limitations are the very 
keys to predictability, in the sense that everyone is treated in the same manner and 
everyone knows or can discover the rules in advance of their application"). 
141. Odin v. United States, 656 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("In the early twen­
tieth century, however, Congress began serious consideration of a general tort claims 
statute, because of ... the unfairness inherent in the immunity doctrine. . . . These 
efforts culminated in 1946 with the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act ...." (cita­
tion omitted». 
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line rule of law that FRCP 15(c) has no application to FICA claims 
presents a procedural injustice that is contrary to the spirit of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, the Analysis will con­
clude by recommending a number of factors courts should consider 
when presented with amended FICA claims like those of 
Catherine Deegan Patterson and Yvonne Deegan Gioka. 
A. 	 Bright-Line Rule Disallowing Relation Back in FTCA Claims 
Is Contrary to the Objectives of the Act 
Congressional passage of the FICA in 1946 was a historic mo­
ment in the development of tort claims against the U.S. govern­
ment. In waiving the sovereign immunity of the Executive as to the 
tortious acts of its officers and employees, it is quite clear that the 
chief purpose of the Act was to broaden the government's liability 
as to tort claims, with the underlying objective of providing justice 
to parties injured by the government.142 As such, strictly construing 
the FICA's limitations period to disallow relation back in any 
FICA claim, based in part on traditional notions of sovereign im­
munity, runs contrary to the intent of this legislative measure, which 
was meant as a remedy for private citizens injured by the tortious 
conduct of government employees. 
1. 	 Congress Enacted the FICA in Order to Broaden the 
Government's Accountability in Tort 
The harsh bright-line approach taken by the Courts of Appeals 
for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits-disallowing relation back in any 
FICA claims, regardless of the factual and procedural circum­
stances-undermines the pro-plaintiff legislative goals of the 
FICA. Prior to the enactment of the FICA, private citizens en­
joyed little solace when injured by tortious acts of government offi­
cials or employees. Individuals who were injured by a government 
employee's wrongdoing could only file suit directly against the gov­
ernment employee, rather than the federal government itself under 
a vicarious liability theory.143 This left injured victims with little 
possibility of collecting an adequate judgment unless the particular 
government official was wealthy. While relief was also available 
through a private bill in Congress, these bills could not fairly and 
142. 	 Bermann, supra note 102, at 524. 
143. 	 Wexler, supra note 54, at 2933; see supra text accompanying note 71. 
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adequately compensate injured citizens, as the process was quite 
burdensome and time-consuming.144 
Additionally, as pointed out by many legal scholars, it is the 
judicial system, rather than legislative branch, that is "generally a 
more suitable forum for the adjudicatory process of determining 
the liability of the United States in tort."145 After Congress passed 
the FICA in 1946, expressly waiving governmental immunity with 
respect to tort suits brought forth by private citizens, the D.C. Cir­
cuit articulated the legislative objectives underpinning the Act 
rather poignantly in Odin v. United States: 
Congress passed the [flCA] to remove the often unjust shield 
provided by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and for the 
"broad and just purpose" of "compensating the victims of negli­
gence in the conduct of governmental activities." This goal of 
just compensation is not advanced by refusing to allow unknowl­
edgeable claimants to amend their claims and seek all their dam­
ages when they failed, through ignorance of technical 
governmental procedures, to request their full damages in their 
original claims.146 
In Odin, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit acknowl­
edged that the primary objective of the FICA is just compensation 
for those injured as a result of governmental tortious conduct.l47 A 
strict refusal to permit the operation of FRCP 15(c) to all FICA 
claims is precisely the technical procedural barrier that the Odin 
court held the Act should be construed to avoid.l48 Accordingly, 
the legislative goals of the FICA are not adequately served when 
144. Read, supra note 74, at 789. Before the flCA, those who were injured by 
government employees faced "a very difficult and unappealing choice." Id. The plain­
tiffs could sue the government employee individually. However, if the plaintiff won a 
favorable judgment, equitable compensation depended on the individual defendant's 
ability to pay the judgment. If this course of action seemed overly troublesome, a plain­
tiff could, in the alternative, petition Congress for relief. [d. However, "[t]he former 
was risky unless the government employee was wealthy, and the latter was burdensome 
and time-consuming." [d. For a thorough analysis on the burdens associated with pri­
vate relief bills, see JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 75, § 2.02 (noting that because 
private bills were typically a claimant's only relief measure, "it was not long before 
petitions for relief became so numerous that Congress found itself under an intense and 
time-consuming burden of attempting to adjudicate, to the detriment of its duty to legis­
late"). See also supra text accompanying notes 72-75. 
145. Developments, supra note 57, at 888. 
146. Odin, 656 F.2d at 805 (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 
61, 68 (1955)). 
147. Id. 
148. Id.; see also Lopez v. United States, 758 F.2d 806, 809 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating 
that the flCA "was designed to accord injured parties an opportunity for recovery 'as 
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FRCP 15(c) is not applied to a federal law, and should not be con­
strued as such unless expressly stated by legislative measure. 149 
2. 	 Government's Reliance on Sovereign Immunity Has No 
Merit in the Modern Construction of Federal 
Statutes 
The adherence by the judicial branch to sovereign immunity 
principles, even when construing federal statutes that expressly 
waive this immunity, is inconsistent with the fundamental principles 
of American government. As stated by Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky: 
A doctrine derived from the premise that "the King can do no 
wrong" deserves no place in American law. The United States 
was founded on a rejection of a monarchy and of royal preroga­
tives. American government is based on the fundamental recog­
nition that the government and government officials can do 
wrong and must be held accountable. Sovereign immunity un­
dermines that basic notion.150 
Even so, for more than 150 years the Supreme Court has held 
that "sovereign immunity is a doctrine that protects the United 
States" against liability absent its express consent to suit,151 Not 
only is the doctrine still adhered to in many areas of federal, and 
primarily state government,152 but it is often given considerable 
a matter of right'.... [T]he law was not intended to put up a barrier of technicalities to 
defeat their claims" (quoting S. REP. No. 79-1400, at 31 (1946))). 
149. For a discussion on the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
to inconsistent federal statutes, see Gregory J. Ressa, Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Forthwith Service Requirement of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 54 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1195, 1203 (1986) (noting that when a FRCP conflicts with federal 
procedural statute, an issue of legislative intent arises). 
150. Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 1202 (citation omitted). 
151. Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses ofHistory, 81 NEB. L. REV. 
1,8 (2002); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 1203 ("[T]he Court has indicated no 
Willingness or likelihood of relaxing the sovereign immunity of the United States 
government."). 
152. Reviewing several recent Supreme Court decisions that deal with state im­
munity claims, Professor Chemerinsky notes that "sovereign immunity is not fading 
from American jurisprudence; quite the contrary, the Supreme Court is dramatically 
expanding its scope." Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 1202; see Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (holding that sovereign immunity broadly protects state govern­
ments from being sued in state court, based on the rationale that "the Constitution's 
structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear 
[that] the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of ... sovereignty"); Semi­
nole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,54 (1996) (holding that Congress's ability to 
authorize suits against state governments and to override sovereign immunity is greatly 
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weight when courts construe laws that waive sovereign immunity.I53 
The Court has declared that conditions providing for governmental 
waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign, and not 
read for more than what the language precisely permits.154 As 
such, courts denying relation back of amended FICA claims have, 
in large part, rested their holdings on this strict interpretation when 
applying sovereign immunity principles.155 
While the doctrine of sovereign immunity has a long history 
entrenched in the English feudal system, protecting the English sov­
ereign from suit for centuries,156 federal sovereign immunity has no 
constitutional basis in the United States.157 In fact, giving weight to 
the doctrine may even be inconsistent with the Constitution.15s 
Moreover, as the doctrine effectively puts the government above 
the law, a notion that "is inconsistent with a central maxim of 
American government,"159 the judicial system should not be giving 
sovereign immunity principles much authority, if any, when con­
struing American laws. This is particularly true when Congress ex-
limited by the Eleventh Amendment, which presupposes that "'it is inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty [for the government] not to be amenable to the suit of an individ­
ual without its consent'" (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890))); see also 
Jeffrey K. O'Connor, Note, Is It the Officer or the Gentleman?: Issues of Capacity in 
§ 1983 Actions Brought in Federal Court, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 336-37 (2006) 
(noting that while "Congress may abrogate state immunity by clear statutory intent ... 
after Seminole Tribe, it appears that this is only available when Congress is legislating 
pursuant to the enforcement power conferred by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
153. Read, supra note 74, at 788 ("[B]ecause one of the reasons for sovereign 
immunity is the presumption that laws are made in order to govern citizens and not to 
bind the sovereign, when laws are passed which expressly waive this sovereign immu­
nity and bind the United States, they are strictly construed." (citation omitted)). 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 119-120. 
155. Supra text accompanying notes 119-120; see also Scarborough v. Principi, 
541 U.S. 401, 423 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[I]n a case ... where the statute 
defines the scope of the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity ... [and] there is 
no express allowance for relation back ... I conclude that the sovereign immunity 
canon applies to construe strictly the scope of the Government's waiver."). 
156. Developments, supra note 57, at 829. 
157. Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 1202. 
158. Chemerinsky argues: 
Article VI of the Constitution states that the Constitution and laws made pur­
suant to them are the supreme law, and, as such, it should prevail over govern­
ment claims of sovereign immunity. Yet, sovereign immunity, a common law 
doctrine, trumps even the Constitution and bars suits for relief against govern­
ment entities in violation of the Constitution and federal laws. 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (referring to the "nonconstitutional but ancient doctrine of sovereign 
immunity"). 
159. Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 1202. 
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pressly waives executive immunity as to wrongful conduct on behalf 
of its officers and employees, as it did when it passed the FTCA. 
A true democratic system of government will only be fully real­
ized if the sovereign itself provides its constituents with appropriate 
judicial recourses, which can be used when the government wrongs 
its citizens.16o However, the strict construction of federal laws­
many of which are intended to provide remedies to private citi­
zens-limits an injured plaintiff's ability to seek redress, in part due 
to a judicial acceptance of sovereign immunity.161 These limitations 
have little policy support in modern American jurisprudence.162 As 
such, sovereign immunity principles should not be considered when 
courts construe provisions of federal laws, including the FTCA's 
statute of limitations period. 
B. 	 Legislative Goals of the FTCA's 1966 Amendments Should 
Further the Application of Relation Back Rather than 
Suppress It 
In 1966, Congress amended the FTCA by enacting an adminis­
trative claim requirement to address congressional concerns arising 
from the flood of lawsuits filed after passage of the FTCA.163 Addi­
tionally, legislators acted upon a fear that "these areas of litigation 
[were] expanding at a steady pace."164 Under this new procedural 
requirement, Congress mandated that all claims brought under the 
FICA first be presented to the federal agency whose employee al­
legedly caused the injury complained of before suit could be filed in 
court.165 Congress felt that the new process would allow federal 
agencies to settle a greater number of tort claims, giving the govern­
160. Developments, supra note 57, at 829. 
161. Id. 
162. Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 1223. "The strongest argument for sovereign 
immunity likely is tradition: It has existed, in some form, through most of American 
history and is based on English law. But this begs the central question: Is this a tradi­
tion that should continue?" Id. Professor Chemerinsky declares it should not, and ar­
gues that "[s]overeign immunity conflicts with other, more important traditions in 
American law: enforcing the Constitution and federal laws, ensuring government ac­
countability, and providing due process of law." Id. 
163. S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 2 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 
2516. 
164. 	 Id. at 6. 
165. 28 U.S.c. § 2401(b) (2000). During this administrative-exhaustion process, 
the appropriate federal agency evaluates the claim in an effort to determine if it is 
meritorious, and has six months to make a final disposition on the claim. If the agency 
denies the claim, or an agreement is not reached within six months, the claimant may 
file suit in federal court. Id. § 2675(a). 
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ment additional time and resources to allocate towards claims 
presenting more complex legal issues and questions of fact. 166 As 
such, "the mandatory administrative claims process [was] intended 
to serve as an efficient effective forum for rapidly resolving tort 
claims with low costs to all participants."167 Additionally, the pro­
cess sought "to maximize the benefit achieved through application 
of prompt, fair and efficient techniques that achieve an informal 
resolution of administrative tort claims without burdening claim­
ants or the agency."168 
In passing the 1966 amendments to the FICA, Congress ulti­
mately furthered two stated goals: (1) providing private claimants 
with a fair and expeditious procedure when seeking redress against 
the government, and (2) easing court congestion by giving the ap­
propriate federal agencies an opportunity to settle these claims 
themselves.169 Denying relation back in FICA claims, irrespective 
of the particular circumstances before a court, runs contrary to the 
first goal, and does little to advance the second. 
1. Fair and Expeditious Treatment of Claims 
The legislative history of the 1966 amendments to the FTCA, 
along with the accompanying committee reports, demonstrates that 
a primary objective of the amendments was to provide alleged vic­
tims of governmental wrongs a more equitable remedy process. l7O 
Prior to the amendments, the only available course of action for 
FTCA claimants was to file a claim just as any private tort claimant 
would, unless the claim was for less than $2500.171 However, with 
the 1966 amendments came a procedure in which the appropriate 
federal agency, which had a sizable amount of resources at its dis­
posal and experience with settling these types of claims, would have 
166. Read, supra note 74, at 791. 
167. Id. at 831 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 14.6(a) (2005». 
168. Id. 
169. S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 2. 
170. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 89-1532, at 6-7 (1966). 
171. S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 2; Shahan J. Kapitanyan, Note, The Federal Tort 
Claims Act Presentment Requirement: Minimal Notice Sufficient to Pass Legal Muster 
and Preserve the Right to File a Subsequent Lawsuit in Federal Court, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 145, 148-49 (2001). For claims that were less than $2500, a claimant had the choice 
of filing an administrative claim with the corresponding government agency or com­
mencing the action in federal court. Id. at 148. If the claimant chose the former, he 
could not file suit in district court until the agency had fully disposed of the claim. Id. at 
149. This administrative filing was optional. Id. 
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the authority to settle the claim itself.172 Given the complexities 
and high costs of litigation that typically accompany tort claims, a 
procedure that facilitates out-of-court settlement is quite beneficial 
to the private plaintiff.173 
The 1966 amendments to the flCA were a legislative measure 
that sought to provide an equitable form of redress to those injured 
by government. Given this pro-plaintiff congressional action, the 
flCA limitations period should not be construed so strictly as to 
bar an injured claimant's meritorious claim on the theory of a 
court-fashioned rule of law that has no legislative supportY4 This 
construction is especially troubling, given that there is no indication 
in the text of the flCA's limitations provision that supports this 
position.175 Therefore, the legislative goal of making the flCA 
claims process more amenable to plaintiffs is in no way furthered, 
and is in fact hindered by refusing to allow relation back in all such 
actions. 
2. 	 Increasing the Settlement Probability of flCA Claims 
and Reducing Court Congestion 
The 1966 amendments had the additional purpose of reducing 
the number of flCA claims filed in court by increasing out-of­
court settlement of such claims, and thereby reducing court conges­
tion.176 By enlarging administrative authority to settle appropriate 
claims, the role of the judiciary in handling governmental tort 
claims was reduced, thus accomplishing the goal of judicial econ­
172. S. REp. No. 89-1327, at 2 ("Tort claims against the Government for the most 
part arise in connection with the activities of ... the Post Office Department, the De­
fense Department, the Veterans' Administration, the Department of the Interior, and 
the Federal Aviation Agency. These agencies ... have a large degree of experience in 
settling such claims."). 
173. Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Notice of Claim Requirement, 67 MINN. L. 
REV. 513, 519 (1982). 
174. "The Eighth Circuit's opinion [in Manko] does virtually nothing to explain 
the source of its rule, ... [and] no other source for its rule can be found in the flCA, so 
the Eighth Circuit fabricated its own rule essentially out of whole cloth." Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, Lee v. United States, 509 U.S. 913 (1993) (No. 92-1390). 
175. Id. 
176. The 1966 amendments encourage settlement and thus eliminate "the need 
for filing suit and possible expensive and time-consuming litigation." S. REP. No. 89­
1327, at 2; see also Read, supra note 74, at 791 (noting that in 1965, "approximately 
eighty percent of the meritorious claims filed against the Government under the flCA 
were settled prior to trial"). As such "legislators hoped that passage of the amendment 
would permit federal agencies to settle substantial numbers of tort claims, thus enabling 
the Department of Justice's Civil Division to give greater attention to those cases that 
involved difficult legal and damage questions." Id. 
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omy.177 As increased pre-litigation settlement is facilitated by com­
pliance with the administrative claim process, adequate notice to 
the appropriate federal agency is "necessary for the fruitful settle­
ment of claims."178 
The importance of the administrative handling of FICA claims 
in order to encourage out-of-court settlement is stressed by the 
courts that have refused to permit relation back of amended FICA 
claims. These courts, particularly the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit in Manko, have pointed out that amendments that 
add new parties or claims are likely to increase, often substantially, 
the amount of damages sought by the injured claimant.179 Allowing 
these amended claims to go forward would unfairly tamper with the 
government's "settlement calculus" because they would not have 
been factored into the equation when the government investigated 
and negotiated the plaintiff's original claim.180 As such, courts re­
fusing to permit relation back rely quite heavily on the argument 
that relation back of amended claims frustrates the FICA's admin­
istrative filing requirements, and thus is not permissible as a matter 
of law.181 
While at first glance this appears to be a very strong factor in 
favor of refusing to apply FRCP 15(c) to FICA claims, it is prob­
lematic in several aspects. First and foremost, unbridled support 
for the pre-settlement goals of the 1966 FICA amendments fails to 
consider the dual objective of providing for more equitable treat­
ment to private claimants when dealing with the government.182 As 
future courts address the applicability of relation back within the 
177. Sidney B. Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 67 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1212, 1212-13 (1967). 
178. Kapitanyan, supra note 171, at 166 (discussing the competing legislative 
goals of the 1966 FICA amendments, specifically that of judicial economy and the equi­
table treatment of private FICA claimants); see also Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. 
Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that the purpose of the administrative filing 
requirements "is to spare the Court the burden of trying cases when the administrative 
agency can settle the case without litigation"). 
179. Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831, 841 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Lee v. 
United States, 980 F.2d 1337, 1341 (10th Cir. 1992); Withrow v. United States, No. Civ. 
A. 5:05-152-JMH, 2005 WL 2403730, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2005). 
180. Manko, 830 F.2d at 841 ("Allowing material changes in claims after [the 
expiration of the limitations period) would severely disrupt the settlement process."); 
see supra text accompanying notes 130-131. 
181. Lee, 980 F.2d at 1341 (finding that permitting relation back of an amended 
FICA claim "would ... violate congressional intent to create a system for administra­
tive agencies dealing with specific claims"). 
182. S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 2 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 
2516. 
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realm of the FICA, it is essential that these competing interests are 
given equal consideration. In order to properly "strike a balance 
between seeking judicial economy and providing claimants with eq­
uitable relief,"183 both of these interests need to be factored into 
the equation. This will ensure that the FICA's limitations period is 
not turned into an absolute procedural barrier that bars otherwise 
meritorious amended claims from ever having the chance to be liti­
gated, especially when the government is on notice of the new claim 
from the outset of the litigation.184 
Second, and perhaps equally persuasive, is the fact that many 
of the tardy amended FICA complaints that seek to apply relation 
back are filed with the appropriate federal agency while the original 
(and properly filed) claim remains pending with the government. I85 
The effect of this circumstance is twofold: First, the filing of an 
amended administrative claim while the original is still pending 
with the federal agency does not rob the government of its chance 
to factor the new damages into its settlement negotiations. This 
avoids the problem addressed by the Courts of Appeal for the 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits pertaining to the application of FRCP 
15(c) preventing the administrative agencies from being able to im­
plement an effective "settlement calculus" while negotiating claims 
with injured citizens.I86 
Equally important is the prejudicial effect that delay on the 
part of the administrative agency in making a disposition on the 
claim will have on the injured private citizen. Under the adminis­
trative filing requirements created by the 1966 amendments to the 
FICA, the appropriate federal agency has six months to reach final 
disposition of a claim after the original filing date.187 The failure of 
the agency to reach a disposition within six months may be consid­
ered to be a "final denial" by the claimant, permitting him to end 
the administrative process and file suit in the appropriate federal 
district court.188 However, the claimant is not required to file suit 
183. Kapitanyan, supra note 171, at 165-66. 
184. Odin v. United States, 656 F.2d 798, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Laurie 
Helzick, Looking Forward: A Fairer Application of the Relation Back Provisions ofFed­
eral Rule of Civil Procedure J5(c), 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 140 (1988) (noting that 
"[r]elation back was developed in order to liberalize the rules of pleading for the plain­
tiff without contravening the policies behind the statute of limitations"). 
185. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 174, at 10. 
186. Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831, 841 (8th Cir. 1987). 
187. 28 u.s.c. § 2675(a) (2000). 
188. /d. 
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and may continue to negotiate with the government to reach an 
acceptable settlement.189 
Unfortunately, for plaintiffs filing FTCA claims, many of which 
are filed pro se by the injured person or a family member,190 admin­
istrative negotiations may continue for several years after the filing 
of the claim, well beyond the FTCA's two-year limitations pe­
riod.191 Naturally, if a pro se plaintiff receives no notice from the 
administrative agency regarding the claim, it is unlikely he will seek 
representation until the claim is finally denied by the government, 
at which point his only recourse is through federal district court.192 
However, if the claim is denied after the expiration of the FTCA's 
limitations period, subsequent meritorious claims that may be dis­
covered upon a plaintiff's first retaining counsel will only have a 
chance at being litigated through the relation-back doctrine. 
As such, strict refusal to permit application of the doctrine puts 
the injured plaintiff in an unfair position, and allows the govern­
ment an added incentive in the negotiation process to stretch the 
denial of a claim beyond the acceptable limitations date. While in­
jured tort victims lie uncompensated, the FTCA's administrative fil­
ing requirement unfairly gives the government an incentive to drag 
on the litigation beyond the limitations period. It is no wonder that 
one author has noted that "[t]he number of failed claims resulting 
from the FTCA presentation requirements is depressing. . .. Many 
meritorious claims have never received a hearing, no doubt leaving 
their proponents to wonder how sincere is Congress's pledge to rec­
ompense victims of negligent or wrongful acts of government 
employees."193 
Therefore, whether the appropriate federal agency has made a 
final disposition of the claim-ending any possibility of negotiating 
a settlement at the administrative level-is a factor courts should 
189. Zillman, supra note 99, at 969. 
190. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 174, at 12. 
191. Zillman, supra note 99, at 969 (discussing the proper presentation of FfCA 
claims, and noting that "[o]ften administrative negotiations will continue for several 
years after the filing of the claim "). 
192. The administrative claim process is deceptively simple, as a series of legal 
issues lay beneath the apparently simple framework. See Bermann, supra note 102, at 
563-64. FfCA procedures, namely its administrative exhaustion requirement, "are dif­
ferent from private party tort litigation and actions against other government entity 
defendants." Zillman, supra note 99, at 967. While it is not unreasonable to expect pro 
se litigants to be familiar with this process, courts should recognize that demanding 
strict compliance with the FfCA's administrative filing requirements will likely result in 
many claims being dismissed on purely technical grounds. 
193. Zillman, supra note 99, at 996. 
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consider when deciding whether to apply FRCP 15(c) to tardy 
FICA amendments. The bright-line approach taken by the Courts 
of Appeals for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits194 prevents a court 
presented with the issue from considering this factor. 
C. 	 The History and Development of the Relation-Back Doctrine 
Demand that FRCP J5(c) Has Some Applicability to 
FTCA Claims 
The development of the relation-back doctrine in American ju­
risprudence has focused on an important detail-getting tardy but 
otherwise meritorious claims to trial.195 Rule makers have consist­
ently demonstrated that they favor a liberal construction and appli­
cation of FRCP 15(c).196 They began broadening the relation-back 
doctrine by abandoning the common law "cause-of-action" test197 
and have continued to expand the rule by adding legislative amend­
ments.198 This legislative expansion of the relation-back doctrine is 
in accordance with the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure as to the governance of pleadings in general.199 Additionally, 
the 1966 amendments to FRCP 15(c), which specifically broadened 
the rule in part to rectify a trend of harsh results arising in certain 
aCtions by private parties against officers or agencies of the United 
States (including FICA claims), demonstrate a further congres­
sional desire to adequately provide plaintiffs with a judicial forum 
for meritorious claims, especially claims filed against the govern­
194. Lee v. United States, 980 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992); Manko v. United States, 
830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987); see also supra Part II.B. 
195. Woods v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ., 996 F.2d 880, 883 (7th Cir. 1993) ("We 
have long left no doubt of the broad scope to be given FRCP 15(c)."). The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also noted relation back "has its roots in the equitable 
notion that dispositive decisions should be based on the merits rather than technicali­
ties." !d. at 884. 
196. See 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 15.02[1] (noting that FRCP 15 in gen­
eral is meant to allow for the liberal allowance of amendments "in the interests of 
resolving cases on the merits"); see also Siegel v. Converters Transp., Inc., 714 F.2d 213, 
216 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that for over forty years FRCP 15(c) has been liberally 
construed). 
197. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 17-26. 
198. 	 See supra notes 46-5l. 
199. 	 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957); see also Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 
U.S. 21 (1986), superseded by FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3) (1991 Amendments). In specifi­
cally addressing the application of FRCP 15(c) to pleadings that misname the proper 
defendants, Justice Blackmun made evident that as "Justice Black reminded [the 
Court], more than 30 years ago ... the 'principal function of procedural rules should be 
to serve as useful guides to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal right to bring 
their problems before the courts.'" Id. at 27 (quoting Order Adopting Revised Rules 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, 346 U.S. 945, 946 (1954». 
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ment.2OO A bright-line rule disallowing the application of FRCP 
15( c) to any FTCA clairr. is in sharp contrast to these legislative 
goals. 
1. Purpose of FRCP 15(c) 
"The primary purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
is to facilitate the presentation of cases and promote their disposi­
tion on the merits."201 FRCP 15(c) supports this objective by per­
mitting a claimant to contravene a statute of limitations and cure an 
otherwise defective claim by providing liberal standards for deter­
mining when amendments are permitted to relate back to the date 
on which the party filed its original pleading.202 Once the statute of 
limitations has run on a cause of action, FRCP 15(c) is often "the 
only vehicle available for a plaintiff to amend [a] complaint. "203 
Therefore, if the legislative goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure are truly meant to avoid technical pitfalls at the pleading 
stages, courts should not create rules of law that specifically under­
mine these objectives without an express indication from Congress 
that the FRCP at issue is not to apply. At the very least, judicial 
ruling from the bench that an FRCP has no application to a federal 
law should be premised on a finding that the particular statutory 
provision directly conflicts with the FCRP at issue. The FTCA's 
statute of limitations provision does neither of these.204 Instead, 
the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and, subsequently, the 
Tenth Circuit merely "fabricated its own rule essentially out of 
whole cloth," as there is no source of conflict in the statute that 
justifies this new bright-line rule of law within the language of the 
FTCA.205 
Equally persuasive is the language of pertinent Department of 
Justice regulations-specifically 28 C.F.R. § 14.2-which defines 
what constitutes a sufficient administrative claim, and when a claim 
is deemed to be presented.206 One of these guidelines, 28 c.F.R. 
§ 14.2(c), provides that a claim "may be amended by the claimant at 
200. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 1502. 
201. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 671; see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 
(1962). 
202. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 671. 
203. 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 15.19[3][aj. 
204. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 174, at 14 (noting that neither 
the text of the FTCA's limitations provision, nor any other language in the statute, 
supports the position that relation back is not applicable to FTCA claims). 
205. Id. 
206. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (2006). 
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any time prior to final agency action or prior to the exercise of the 
claimant's option [to file suit after six months]."207 While this ap­
parently liberal regulation governing the amendment of flCA 
claims still pending in the administrative channels does not ex­
pressly discuss the amendment of claims filed after the limitations 
period on the original claim has run (in which case relation back 
would demand application), the plain language of the regulatory 
provision is quite clear-an amended claim may be filed at any time 
prior to an agency denial of the claim. The regulation makes no 
mention of the effect an amendment may have if it is filed after the 
two-year limitations period has expired. However, if the federal 
government had intended for relation back not to apply in this cir­
cumstance, it would have regulated accordingly.20s In determining 
that FRCP 15(c) did apply to flCA claims, the Ninth Circuit ac­
knowledged that this plain regulatory language must be taken into 
account when construing the flCA's limitations period.209 
2. 	 Specific Liberalizing Purpose of the 1966 Amendments to 
FRCP 15(c) Is Frustrated if Relation Back Is Not 
Permitted in flCA Claims 
FRCP 15(c) was amended in 1966 to clarify "when an amend­
ment of a pleading changing the party against whom a claim is as­
serted ... shall 'relate back' to the date of the original pleading."210 
The "very important objective of the 1966 amendments to FRCP 
15(c)" was to clarify the application of relation back to suits by pri­
vate citizens against the government.211 This was necessary due to 
the fact that it was in these types of claims that "harsh results fre­
quently were reached."212 Given the complex nature of the federal 
207. Id. § 14.2(c) (emphasis added); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 174, at 14 (noting that the relevant agency regulations "freely authorize amend­
ment of FICA claims pending in federal agencies prior to final agency decision but ... 
give no warning to claimants of the trap that has been created for all claimants by the 
government in [these] cases"). 
208. Interestingly, 28 c.F.R. § 14.2(b)(4), which directly precedes 28 C.F.R. 
§ 14.2(c), does speak directly to the effect that certain administrative FICA claims will 
have on the FICA's limitations period. This strengthens the proposition that, had the 
government intended for tardy amendments to have an effect on the flCA's statute of 
limitations, it would have stated such in the regulation. 
209. Avila v. INS, 731 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that "the strict re­
quirements of the [agency] regulations" did not pose a barrier to the filing of amended 
claims, and in fact expressly provided for them). 
210. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c) advisory committee's notes on 1966 amendments. 
211. Id.; 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 1502. 
212. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 1502. 
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administrative system, private citizens often filed claims that mis­
named or confused the appropriate federal agencies, and amend­
ments that were filed after the limitations period were often denied, 
resulting in the dismissal of otherwise potentially meritorious 
claims.213 As such, the 1966 amendments were intended to "have 
the desirable effect of facilitating a citizen's suit against his sover­
eign by eliminating an unnecessary trap for the unwary."214 Even 
though the thrust of the 1966 amendments to FRCP 15(c) was to 
correct the effect of misnaming a defendant in claims filed by pri­
vate citizens against the government, the force of the 1966 amend­
ments should not be ignored when addressing the applicability of 
relation back of amendments that identify new claims or plaintiffs 
for two important reasons. 
First, while dismissal of meritorious claims due to a plaintiff's 
incorrect naming of the appropriate federal agency was the "techni­
cal pleading error" that was sought to be eradicated, this problem 
likely could have been corrected by a change in the federal statute 
at issue (such as by changing the language of the FTCA), or by an 
administrative regulation that addressed the naming of an improper 
defendant.215 However, given the broader difficulties private liti­
213. See Cohn v. Fed. Sec. Admin., 199 F. Supp. 884 (W.D.N.Y. 1961); Hall v. 
Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 199 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Tex. 1960); Sandridge v. 
Folsom, 200 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Tenn. 1959); Cunningham v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 
541 (W.D. Mo. 1958). For an in-depth look at these cases, which were "quite at odds 
with [his] sense of justice," see Clark Byse, Suing the "Wrong" Defendant in Judicial 
Review of Federal Administrative Action: Proposals for Reform, 77 HARV. L. REV. 40 
(1963). Given the undesirable results of these cases, Byse proposed that FRCP 21 
(which controls the misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties) should have been amended to 
expressly permit, by way of a separate provision, relation back in actions filed against 
the United States, when certain procedural safeguards were met. Id. at 55-56. 
214. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 1502; see also Moore v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., No. 95-1021, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31559, at *4 (7th Cir. Oct. 13,1995) ("[The] 
second paragraph of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) allows liberal amendment to 
add the United States as a defendant. ... [The plaintiff] is thus entitled to the opportu­
nity to add the United States as a proper defendant as a matter of course."); Lojuk v. 
Johnson, 853 F.2d 560, 563-64 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The second paragraph of FRCP 15(c) 
... was added specifically to take care of situations where a person denied federal 
benefits did not file within the appropriate period a civil action against the federal of­
ficer ... but instead wrongly sued an improper governmental defendant."). 
215. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend­
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1),81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 409 (1967). 
When the advisory committee proposed a redrafting of FRCP 15(c) in March 1964, it 
noted several unsatisfactory decisions in which claimants seeking social security benefits 
mistakenly named the United States as defendant, when the correct party was the Sec­
retary of Health, Education, and Welfare. See Cohn, 199 F. Supp. 884; Hall, 199 F. 
Supp. 833; Sandridge, 200 F. Supp. 25; Cunningham, 199 F. Supp. 541; see also Sidney 
B. Jacoby, The Effect of Recent Changes in the Law of "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review, 
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gants often faced when suing the government, "a rule amendment 
seemed in order."216 Consequently, the 1966 amendments were ap­
proved by Congress to facilitate the broader reach of FRCP 1S(c) 
and better arm private litigants as they enter the often tangled and 
often harsh realm of litigating suits against the United States.217 
Additionally, the course of action taken by the Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits has the potential effect of creating the very situation 
that the 1966 amendments sought to redress-dismissing meritori­
ous claims due to the technical errors that in no way prejudice the 
government.218 It is not impossible to contemplate a situation in 
which a party who is injured by a government employee and seeks 
compensation via the FTCA mistakenly files the administrative 
claim with an improper federal agency. If this administrative claim 
is denied after the statute of limitations has run on the claim, and 
the plaintiff then turns to the federal court system with an amended 
claim that corrects the party misnomer, a district court in one of 
these circuits would interpret the court of appeals' holding as com­
pletely barring the relation back of an amended FTCA claim. Un­
fortunately, the plaintiff would then be stuck with a defective 
pleading that would demand dismissal of the action. This is pre­
cisely the procedural trap that the 1966 amendments sought to elim­
inate with respect to claims filed by private litigants against the 
government. Even so, the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits' fashioning of an unprecedented rule of law, namely 
53 GEO. L.J. 19, 42 (1964). In these cases, a tardy amendment to name the proper 
defendant was denied. Id. In response, the Social Security Administration, "in an at­
tempt to prevent similar situations in the future," amended its own regulations to gov­
ern these situations, providing that where an improper defendant was named, the 
Administration itself would notify the plaintiff of the error and permit him sixty days to 
correct the complaint. !d. at 43 n.148. While this action was "highly commendable" 
and could have been followed by other federal administrative branches, it "in no way 
lessen[ ed] the desirability of broadly amending FRCP 15( c) ... since [ ] suits for social 
security benefits constitute[d] only one example of a larger problem." Id. 
216. Kaplan, supra note 215, at 408-09 (noting that the problem citizens faced 
when seeking redress from the government was based on a "somewhat wooden applica­
tion of the ideas that private litigants must cut square corners in dealing with the 
Government."). 
217. Helzick, supra note 184, at 137 ("The amended FRCP 15(c) was intended to 
dispel the confusion regarding the requirement for relation back of claims against all 
parties, private and governmental."); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c) advisory commit­
tee's notes on 1966 amendments ("In actions between private parties, the problem of 
relation back of amendments ... has generally been better handled by the courts, but 
incorrect criteria have sometimes been applied, leading sporadically to doubtful re­
sults.... FRCP 15(c) has been amplified to provide a general solution."). 
218. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 1502. 
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that FRCP 15(c) has no applicability to any FTCA claims, presents 
claimants with an obstacle of procedural injustice that lawmakers 
sought to eradicate more than fifty years ago. 
D. 	 Factors Courts Should Consider When Confronted with the 
Applicability of FRCP J5(c) to FTCA Claims 
The arguments relied upon by the courts that have fashioned 
the rule of law that FRCP 15(c) has no application to claims filed 
under the FTCA do not outweigh the policy objectives that are ac­
complished by allowing relation back to save amended complaints 
in limited circumstances.219 As such, when confronted with amend­
ments seeking to add new plaintiffs or new claims, courts should 
consider several factors that will both prevent injustice to the gov­
ernment, while at the same time effectuating the policies of FRCP 
15(c). As stated above, these factors seek to promote the just adju­
dication of claims based on their merits rather than disposing of 
them based on technical pleading errors.220 
First, courts should refrain from considering the "ease of con­
gestion" settlement goal as the only objective to be accomplished 
by the administrative filing requirements created by the 1966 
amendments to the FTCA.221 Equally as important to this need of 
reducing court congestion and procuring an out-of-court conclusion 
to FTCA claims is the desire to provide private claimants with a 
suitable process for seeking redress against the government.222 As 
this factor weighs in favor of permitting the relation back of 
amended FTCA claims, it should have the effect of canceling out 
the other stated goal of the 1966 amendments. In choosing not to 
weigh either of these administrative filing goals, the courts give fair 
consideration to the rights of each party involved in the litigation. 
Second, courts should inquire into whether the tardy amended 
claim was filed while the original, timely filed claim was still pend­
ing in the administrative channel with the corresponding federal 
agency. If this is indeed the case, courts can look more favorably 
upon applying relation back to the tardy amendment, as the gov­
ernment still has a chance to factor the new damages into its settle­
219. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 195-198. 
220. 	 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). 
221. S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 2 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 
2516. 
222. 	 Id. 
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ment negotiations.223 This would side-step the problem focused on 
by the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits pertain­
ing to FRCP 15(c) preventing the administrative agencies not being 
able to implement an effective "settlement calculus," while at the 
same time taking away a clear advantage afforded to the govern­
ment if it decides to prolong the settlement process beyond plain­
tiff's afforded limitations period. 
Finally, after the above factors are taken into consideration, 
the court should apply a modified form of FRCP 15(c) analysis to 
determine if relation back is permissible to the FTCA claim 
presented. Assuming the amended claim is filed with the appropri­
ate federal agency while the original claim is pending, the court 
should inquire into whether the plaintiff is adding a new claim or 
adding a new party to the action. Claims asserting new parties 
should be scrutinized with more caution, as the government is more 
likely to be prejudiced on account of having no notice of the new 
litigant from the outset of the action.224 Therefore, a heightened or 
strict notice requirement should be employed by the presiding court 
in order to ensure that the government is not prejudiced by the fact 
that it was not afforded the benefit of the new party exhausting the 
administrative claims process prior to filing the action in federal 
court. 
However, when the original party is only filing a new claim that 
arises out of the conduct or transaction of the underlying factual 
223. Compare, e.g., Lee v. United States, 980 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992), with 
Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987). In Lee, the plaintiff filed her 
amended FICA claim while the original claim was pending with appropriate govern­
ment agency. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 174, at 5. As such, the govern­
ment could have altered its settlement calculus before making a final disposition of the 
original claim, and a potential settlement that factored in the new claims could have 
been negotiated at the administrative level. However, in Manko the plaintiff filed her 
amended claim after the federal agency had denied the original administrative claim. 
Id. at 10. In such a case, the government can make a stronger argument that the settle­
ment process was "severely disrupt[ed]," as the federal agency did not have an ample 
opportunity to factor in these new claims and increased damage requests at the admin­
istrative level. Manko, 830 F.2d at 84l. 
224. 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 15.19[3][a] ("Courts generally allow the 
relation back of amendments to add claims more freely than amendments to add par­
ties."); see also Intown Props. Mgmt., Inc. v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 271 F.3d 164, 170 
(4th Cir. 2001) ("Rule 15 has its limits, and courts properly exercise caution in review­
ing an application of the rule that would increase a defendant's exposure to liability. 
Thus, an amendment to the pleadings that drags a new defendant into a case will not 
relate back to the original claims unless that defendant had fair notice of them."); Mar­
tell v. Trilogy, Ltd., 872 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating when seeking to change an 
opponent party, "[t]he litigant seeking amendment must satisfy more stringent 
requirements"). 
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circumstances, traditional FRCP 15(c) analysis should apply; the 
notice requirement should not be subject to a strict or heightened 
standard of review. This traditional relation back analysis is neces­
sary for several different reasons. First, claims that simply assert 
new causes of action, as opposed to a new party, have usually been 
given more favorable deference by courts called on to determine 
whether FRCP 15(c) can save an otherwise tardy and defective 
claim.225 Second, this protects the plaintiff's right to avail himself of 
the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and sustain a 
judgment on the merits of the claim, as opposed to facing dismissal 
as a result of technical pleading errors. Finally, given the amount of 
flCA claims with which federal administrative agencies are accus­
tomed to dealing, it is far more likely to be on notice of a potential 
claim that the plaintiff has omitted from his administrative form 
when commencing an action against the government than would a 
typical private defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Private litigants spend a tremendous amount of time and 
money on flCA claims, many of which are dismissed for technical 
pleading errors.226 This forces a vast number of injured citizens, 
many with meritorious claims, to suffer harm without adequate 
compensation. Although their tort claims would likely have been 
found valid if filed against a private citizen, their actions are held 
untimely and dismissed because the opposing party is the govern­
ment. Clearly a statute of limitations belongs within the American 
legal framework. However, procedural rules like relation back 
have been adopted to alleviate the harshness of the limitations de­
fense. Even so, a rule of law that FRCP 15(c) has absolutely no 
application to flCA claims is the prevailing view in the courts of 
appeals today. Nevertheless, this rule has not been adopted by any 
legislative measure, but instead has been applied as the result of an 
unsupported reading of the flCA's limitations period and the case 
law interpreting this statute. 
Any factors that may persuade a court to determine a rule of 
law that FRCP 15(c) has no application to flCA claims must be 
balanced against the fundamental policies underlying the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which demand that technical pleading er­
225. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 677 (noting that there is a greater likelihood that a 
defendant will be prejudiced when a new party is added). 
226. Zillman, supra note 99, at 996. 
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rors should not necessarily be outcome determinative.227 Courts 
must not be permitted to apply a bright-line rule that unfairly ab­
solves the government of liability, even though it has potentially 
wronged one of its citizens. Therefore, in cases like those involving 
Catherine Deegan Patterson and her sister Yvonne Deegan 
Gioka,228 the United States should not be allowed to hide behind 
procedural barriers based on judicially crafted rules of law. Instead 
it must be forced to answer for the wrongful (and occasionally ap­
palling) conduct of its federal employees by permitting those citi­
zens injured by acts of the government to seek redress against the 
sovereign and have their day in court. Denying relation back of 
FTCA claims, irrespective of the facts and procedural settings of 
the cases, simply has no place in modern American jurisprudence. 
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